Annotations for Speakers: Bryan Frizzelle

Hey, Dr. Suri and Zachary, thanks so much for having me on. It's an absolute honor. I'm super excited to talk about topics that I'm just so passionate about. I do want to open, though, with a quick disclaimer that any views expressed here on this podcast are my own and do not represent Department of the Army or Department of Defense and certainly not NATO policy, but I'm excited to have this conversation.

Sure. So, first of all, I just want to say I love listening to this podcast, mostly for Zachary's poems. And so he's given me a lot to think about there. And something he said in there made me think about this being the first "TikTok war" that we have going on today. So NATO, of course, was founded in 1949 with its 12 original members signing the Washington Treaty. And, of course, this is when much of Europe is in the ashes and just really beginning to recover from the devastation of World War II. And it's, you know, it's sort of the original charter of transatlanticism. You know, the United States and Canada from North America are two of the original members. And then 10 at the time, just Western European countries. And I think one way to think about why is NATO, you know, why are the particular 30 members today up from the original 12? Like, you know, why has this come to pass? I think to some degree, international relations theory shed some light on this. And I think NATO, when it was founded, really fell more into the realist kind of, you know, IR theory camp. And it was, you know, it was always for something, specifically the principles of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law. But it was really against something just as much, and it was against the Soviet Union and what it stood for.

And it was all about the collective defense of Western Europe at the time. And then, you know, in 1989 through 1991, when, you know, to the surprise of many, the Berlin Wall falls, the Warsaw Pact dissolves, the Soviet Union disintegrates. And NATO's really their reason for existing, i.e. the Soviet Union, you know, is no longer such a threat. And so, you know, the London summit in 1991 is really when NATO leaders ask one another, you know, what is our reason for existing now? And I think this is when we see a fundamental shift, really, from sort of the realist IR theory to really liberal internationalism. And more back to, as I mentioned at the beginning, in 1949, NATO was always for something, not just against the Soviet Union, right? And so really in 1991, this is when we start to see consideration of promotion of democracy, expanded cooperation and dialogue with former Warsaw Pact members and even former Soviet states in Central and Eastern Europe. And of course, over time, the two biggest tranches are in 1999 with Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary being offered admission. And then in 2004, when, you know, seven more allies are admitted in of particular note, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which are the three former Soviet states. And so I think there's this tension inside of NATO where it kind of goes back and forth between realism and liberal institutionalism or liberal internationalism, I should say. And I wonder now if we might be at another inflection point, you know, where collective defense of Europe, it's an original reason for existing there with NATO, I wonder if that again becomes the central task of the alliance.

Sure. So one of the great, one of my central critiques in my dissertation is that NATO historians, scholars, and I would just say everyday pundits treat NATO from, you know, with the state as the central unit of analysis. And NATO is often considered just an aggregation of X number of members' state preferences. The United States, of course, has always had the largest economy and the largest military inside of NATO. And therefore, you know, its preferences are seen as counting, you know, the most relative to other allies. And I think that that's, you know, a fundamentally insufficient means of understanding the alliance and how it works. The institution of NATO matters and the institution of NATO, specifically its political headquarters in Brussels, and then its military headquarters at SHAPE in Mons. And I think too often we overlook the key role that institutional leaders represented by the secretary general, you know, at the political headquarters in Brussels and then the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, particularly during the Cold War, but even still today, really play a central role in what policies or adaptations NATO makes. And so I think NATO is, you know, we have to account for the institution as well in any kind of outcomes and not just treat it as an aggregation of states.

Absolutely. And I think that was a great synopsis of what I find in my dissertation. But another one of the central themes that you just described is the power of what I call "transnational interpersonal networks." And so, you know, there are a community, it's not formally organized, of just experienced NATO hands. It could be political leaders, it may be many times academics, sometimes it's retired military officers. And through their experience and their jobs, their assignments over their careers, working in NATO, they gain a really rich understanding of sort of what's in the realm of possible, either politically or militarily, for the alliance, you know, to be able to do with whatever the issue of the day is at hand.

I want to sort of foot stomp on something you touched on with your previous question, Jeremy, which is that it's really key to understand NATO is a consensus-based organization. That means with today with 30 members, all 30 members have to consent for NATO to, you know, to take a policy action. And, you know, I think sometimes we see how hard it is in a simple, you know, to find a simple majority. Right? And so one might imagine that it can be difficult to find consensus. And so a central critique sometimes is that that limits the boldness, let's say, of NATO adaptations, because you need all 30 members to agree.

With the power of transnational interpersonal networks, in one of my case studies, I look at the NATO training mission in Iraq, which begins in 2004 following the Istanbul summit. And of course, this is on the heels of NATO is trying to heal its wounds over the decision by the American-led coalition of the willing to go to war in Iraq. And of course, you know, several NATO allies, most notably France and Germany, are adamant opponents of this, while others like the United States, United Kingdom and many of the newer allies in Central and Eastern Europe form the coalition of the willing. And so, you know, the alliance is really at a low point here and its political leaders get together at the Istanbul summit 2004 and say, hey, you know, we would like NATO to have a role in Iraq. And the SACEUR at the time, General James Jones, who later is the Obama administration National Security Advisor, realizes that there is no military plan for NATO to have in Iraq. And so he quickly, he leaves the Istanbul summit on June 29th. Rather than flying back to SHAPE headquarters in Belgium, he immediately goes to Washington, D.C. He calls just an informal network of advisors. Some of them, they're multinational on both sides of the Atlantic. Some are academics. Some are retired military officers. In one case, it's a former secretary general. And they convene very hastily in Washington, D.C. and say, you know, what type of military mission do we think is politically palatable? And, you know, we'll add value on the ground in Iraq. And so, you know, they come up with three lines of effort, which is to train the Iraqi security forces in Iraq, a second line of effort to train them out of Iraq, and a third line of effort, which is to equip the Iraqi security forces. And based on the advice and experience of these sort of old hands, that plan is ultimately approved, and the NATO training mission in Iraq moves out with those three lines of effort, and I think makes a pretty significant contribution over seven years to developing the Iraqi security forces. So that's kind of an anecdote that I think really captures the power of transnational interpersonal networks.

I do not, because I think it takes away the agency of about 15 Central and Eastern European countries. Ultimately, these are countries that have sought democracy, they have sought individual liberty, and they've sought to become part of the West, politically, militarily, economically. And I think that their vote counts just as much as Russia's.

Yeah, so there's one of the sort of inflection points is at 2008, at the Bucharest summit, that I think is very relevant today, you know, for our listeners to understand. At the Bucharest summit, this is where NATO offers a map or a membership action plan to Ukraine and Georgia. At the time, Putin had made a major foreign policy speech earlier in the year at the Munich Security Conference, implying that territorial borders and boundaries change repeatedly over history, and neighboring countries' borders weren't sacrosanct to Russia. And so once NATO offers a membership action plan to those two countries, right after that is when we see, you know, Russian military activity in Georgia, and then ultimately down the road in 2014, and today in Ukraine. And so I think as we think back in 1991, Russia was offered, you know, a spot in NATO's partnership for peace along with other former Warsaw Pact members. And for a time, it was an active member. But after a few years, Russian interest sort of fell off and they stopped participating in NATO.

So I think, you know, obviously, in 2014, when Russia annexes Crimea, and then, you know, sends in, you know, little green men to the Donbass region, it's kind of been, relations have been at rock bottom since then. But I do think that there were some opportunities prior to that. In fact, if we look at NATO's, you know, most recent strategic concept from 2010, it refers to Russia as a strategic partnership. Obviously, that, you know, that phrase looks pretty out of date and irrelevant, as we look at today's events. But, you know, finding peace and partnership is also a two-way street. And, you know, there has not been much indication from the Russian side, despite overtures from numerous presidential administrations for a Russian reset, and also from the institutional leaders of NATO, from NATO Secretary Generals, you know, to find ways, you know, towards peace and a common worldview.

Sure. So, you know, Vladimir Putin has famously said, the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century was the disintegration of the Soviet Union. And so, more recently, I think, as recently as last week, we've seen in his speeches, where he also talks even beyond the, you know, the 50 or so year history of the Soviet Union, he talks about the Russian Empire. And he sees Russia as a great power, and Russia has a, you know, a right to a sphere of influence. Because of, again, because of, you know, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, by and large, have demonstrated a desire to be part to be free to be part of the West. And those countries reside, you know, their land is where Putin understands the Russian sphere of influence to reside. And so there's inevitable conflict there.

I think it's also worth noting that, you know, German Chancellor Merkel, for 16 years, she worked, you know, to bring peace and partnership through economic trade. And, you know, as a result, you know, today, we see that, you know, about 40% of Germany's energy needs comes from Russia. And unfortunately, that does not seem to have satiated Putin's desire to invade neighbors.

I think as we look at Russia, they have a long term economic decline projected, I think, as a larger portion, you know, because their economy is so reliant on oil and natural gases. You know, as many countries around the world pursue renewable energy. They also have long term demographic problems. They have poor public health. And I think for that reason, Putin may realize that Russia is probably as strong today as it will be for a really long time. Similarly, as he looks at Ukraine, and we've seen Ukraine aggressively move towards the West. And I think that at the end of the day, Putin's number one concern is staying in power and regime survival. And it really undercuts his autocratic model to see a successful democracy aligned with the West right next door in what he considers his ethnic kinmen.

So there's a number of initiatives from NATO, and many of them started in 2014 and have been accelerated over the past six months. And I think we'll see them continue to evolve over the next few years. So, again, I think 2014 is the key moment to understand. And this is, of course, as I said, starts with Russia annexing Crimea. And NATO at the 2014 Wales Summit does a number of things which are relevant today and beyond. NATO adopts a readiness action plan. And this is where they triple the size of the available NATO response force on the military side, create a very high readiness joint task force for crises like this, for example, that could be employed. And then on the political side, all allies agree to spend two percent of their national GDP on defense within 10 years, so by 2024. And that was a significant milestone for the alliance in terms of burden sharing. As we look at initiatives going forward, six months before this war in Ukraine started, the NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg had already initiated a strategic concept review and process. As I mentioned earlier, NATO's most recent strategic concept is 12 years old now, written in 2010. And so this summer, pre-conflict this summer, NATO intended to agree to a new strategic concept at the Madrid summit in June. And I think it will be really interesting to watch because the strategic concept process was started before there was the crisis in Ukraine. And so it'll be really interesting to see what stays the same, what moves beyond.

I really love the process that NATO is using, though, to drive adaptation. So NATO has produced two reports over in the past few months. One of them is called the NATO 2030 report, written by a bunch of leading experts. And in that one, we see calls for increased national resiliency, among other things, you know, energy security as another initiative. And then we also see NATO produces a second report independently created. It's called the Young Leaders report. And I think that it's really important. I think NATO is really getting it right to get the perspectives of multiple generations of NATO scholars as it looks how to posture itself going forward. I certainly, you know, can't predict the outcome of the current conflict in Ukraine, but we absolutely are seeing NATO aggressively, you know, seek to create a deterrence effect along its eastern flank. Nobody knows at this point what Putin's endgame is. He hasn't said, you know, does it go beyond Ukraine? And so I think it's not coincidental that we see the former Warsaw Pact members and former Soviet states, particularly Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and I would put Romania in this category too, as the most vocal. Bilaterally, not through NATO, but bilaterally are transferring the largest number, for example, of anti-tank weapon systems to the Ukrainian people to defend themselves. And so we see that the NATO response force has been activated for the first time for collective defense purpose, you know, since it was created. We've seen increased deployments from the Germans, from the British, and from the Americans to further the deterrence effect, you know, for the forces that were already in place in the three Baltic countries in Poland and Romania.

So, there's this really tragic dichotomy, right. On the one hand, you can't, can't help but be inspired as we see the bravery and the courage of the Ukrainian citizens against really difficult odds. At the same time, you know, in my 20 years of active service, and, and looking beyond that, as a bit of a NATO historian, this is the most united NATO's ever been, and you mentioned the speech by, you know, Germany's new chancellor, and I think that that's worth double underlining, and you know, I think it was one of the most pivotal foreign policy speeches, I think, in Europe, probably since 2007 when, when Putin made that, you know, really frightening speech at the Munich Security Conference, but you know, Germany, of course, has been the economic heavyweight of the European Union for many years, you know, but in many cases, because of national restrictions they've placed on themselves because of the history of the two world wars, Germany has not wanted to be the leader on the military side of NATO, and so they've always been one of the countries that sort of has a lower percentage of their GDP spent on defense, and it was amazing, and I think groundbreaking, and will really change the future trajectory of NATO when Schultz announced that, you know, an immediate doubling of defense spending, you know, an immediate movement away from energy reliance on Russia, and so I think what we're seeing is the emergence of Germany, you know, not, you know, always, or not always, but you know, for quite a while has been economic heavyweight, and I think that they will become the military heavyweight among European countries and NATO as well, and I think that has a lot of second and third order effects.

So I'm extremely optimistic about the future of NATO and the three principles that it stands for democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law. You know, I wrote down a quote that Chancellor Scholz said towards the beginning of his speech, and he said entering a new era, and that means that the world we now live in is not the one that we knew before. Peace and freedom in Europe have a price tag, and I think that that is really important to think about, you know, before any of this crisis in Ukraine, you know, there's been democratic backsliding in a number of NATO countries on both sides of the Atlantic, and you know, this is an opportunity, NATO, NATO has a history of adapting it needs a crisis to adapt in positive ways to sort of shake it from its state, you know, from from being in stasis, and so this is a real opportunity here. I think we'll see a number of initiatives that come from the alliance to enhance national resiliency, to focus on the protection of democratic processes and institutions, you know, to create a real deterrence effect along the eastern flank to protect its most vulnerable allies, and I think the future is bright for NATO.

Yeah, it's, you know, it's really difficult for me to, you know, comment on current policy, but I think, you know, bilaterally, but not through the institution of NATO, many allies are doing a lot of things for for the Ukrainian people right now, in the, you know... and most notably, the economic sanctions in the United Front that NATO members, and really a lot of global allies, have taken as well against Russia, and I guess I would just add, as well, you know, I think it is fascinating, and feeds my optimism for the future of NATO, and the unity, really, of the West. You know, I saw a survey today from a Finnish broadcasting company in January. Only 30% of Finns favor joining NATO. Today, 53%, 66% if done in tandem with Sweden, and I think that that speaks to the values that NATO stands for, and how maybe Putin, because of his, you know, aggressive actions, illegal actions, and war crimes, I think is waking up some historically neutral countries in Europe and around the world, you know, freedom and democracy are worth fighting for, and I think more and more countries are seeing that.

Thank you. It's absolutely been my pleasure. And every time I hear from Jeremi and Zachary, I learn more.