Episode 186: NATO

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Welcome to our new episode of This is Democracy. This week we're going to focus on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, he most successful alliance in modern history, probably the most successful alliance in most of human history. And that's a big thing to say, but probably true. Successful in the sense that it has, for more than half a century, brought together countries on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean to collectively act for their defense as a group and it has generally worked to the defense of its members. That does not mean there have not been crises and problems. But NATO has had remarkable resilience. And lest one thinks that NATO is archaic, it is now at the center of debates and concerns about the future of security in Europe. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has raised concerns about further Russian aggression into territories that are part of NATO. It's also raised questions as to whether NATO should expand further east to countries like Ukraine and provide them with the protection that they've long wanted.

We are fortunate today to be joined by someone who I think knows more about NATO now than almost anyone else. He certainly knows more than me, which is the best thing a graduate advisor can say about one of his graduate students. This is Bryan Frizzelle, who is both a distinguished military officer and a distinguished scholar. Bryan is a colonel in the U.S. Army with 20 years of active duty service. He's commanded at every level, from platoon through battalion. And he served three combat tours in Iraq, which is extraordinary. From 2014 to 2016, Bryan served as a squadron and regimental operations officer for the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Germany, participating in and planning NATO exercises in 12 East European countries as NATO adapted to Russia's annexation of Crimea and various Russian attacks in the Donbas region. So Bryan has extensive experience in NATO and extensive experience dealing with Russian aggression. Bryan holds a bachelor's of science degree in international strategic history from West Point, the U.S. Military Academy, a master's in policy management from Georgetown, and he's finishing his Ph.D. at the LBJ School of Public Affairs here at UT. And Bryan's Ph.D. is on the history of NATO and how NATO has dealt with internal crises and differences among its members and how it has been able to produce and encourage cooperation among its members despite these crises. Bryan, thank you for joining us. You're the right man for this moment, I think.

"Ode to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. " You worship your own sanity. You hold yourself so righteous. You draw the borders with a pen. Here the free world. Here the fight is. You leave us to the enemy for lacking the good sense. To have chosen the path of righteousness before Khrushchev built his fence. And yet we hold you dear. You hold us, too, with warmth. We cannot help but wonder at your missiles and your core. I would not trade your wide embrace even for a thousand Swedens. But this could be you that stands right now upon the cold street bleeding. And please remember, I know you do at night, that just because it's not your mother, not your brother, doesn't mean it's not your fight. You worship your own sanity. It's true. It is quite clear today. You have not forgotten the fire-bombing night, the storming beaches day. You have not forgotten the feeling at the crosshairs of their nukes. You do not feel any joy when it's the other man who pukes. But please, they are bombing my apartment block. Please, they are storming my beaches in the snow. The banks of my great rivers ache at every blow. But please, they took my son, they took my daughter. And please, sir, if it's not a bother, I stand in front of tanks in the center of my cities while you sit and sway to your peacetime ditties. You worship your own sanity. The sky shall not fall. Pray, you have not forgotten how the bombs dropped, how you sank their greatest fleets. Sir, today these are my countrymen, today those are my streets.

Hey, Dr. Suri and Zachary, thanks so much for having me on. It's an absolute honor. I'm super excited to talk about topics that I'm just so passionate about. I do want to open, though, with a quick disclaimer that any views expressed here on this podcast are my own and do not represent Department of the Army or Department of Defense and certainly not NATO policy, but I'm excited to have this conversation.

We're excited to have you on, Bryan, and thanks for taking the time. We know how busy you are with both your military and your scholarly duties and your family duties right now. So we feel fortunate to have you on. Before we go to our conversation with Bryan, we, of course, have Mr. Zachary Suri's scene-setting poem. What is your poem titled today, Zachary? ("Ode to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.") An ode to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We're moving into new territory here. I love it. Let's hear it.

I love it, Zachary, and I love the mix of very serious analysis and also some humor. What is your poem about?

My poem is really about trying to understand NATO's role in global affairs from the perspective of those countries like Ukraine that have been left out to their great detriment from the NATO alliance in recent years and trying to come to terms with the fact that while NATO promises in many ways peace and freedom, it also restricts and leaves out so many others.

Sure, sure. And there are those who think NATO has expanded too far. And then there are those, you're implying this, who think NATO has not expanded far enough. (Right.) So, Bryan, I think that's a perfect place to start. Why does NATO look the way it does? Why are countries like Poland a part of NATO? It's obviously a late entrant into NATO. Why are countries like that a part of NATO and not countries like Ukraine? How did NATO come into being?

Sure. So, first of all, I just want to say I love listening to this podcast, mostly for Zachary's poems. And so he's given me a lot to think about there. And something he said in there made me think about this being the first "TikTok war" that we have going on today. So NATO, of course, was founded in 1949 with its 12 original members signing the Washington Treaty. And, of course, this is when much of Europe is in the ashes and just really beginning to recover from the devastation of World War II. And it's, you know, it's sort of the original charter of transatlanticism. You know, the United States and Canada from North America are two of the original members. And then 10 at the time, just Western European countries. And I think one way to think about why is NATO, you know, why are the particular 30 members today up from the original 12? Like, you know, why has this come to pass? I think to some degree, international relations theory shed some light on this. And I think NATO, when it was founded, really fell more into the realist kind of, you know, IR theory camp. And it was, you know, it was always for something, specifically the principles of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law. But it was really against something just as much, and it was against the Soviet Union and what it stood for.

And it was all about the collective defense of Western Europe at the time. And then, you know, in 1989 through 1991, when, you know, to the surprise of many, the Berlin Wall falls, the Warsaw Pact dissolves, the Soviet Union disintegrates. And NATO's really their reason for existing, i.e. the Soviet Union, you know, is no longer such a threat. And so, you know, the London summit in 1991 is really when NATO leaders ask one another, you know, what is our reason for existing now? And I think this is when we see a fundamental shift, really, from sort of the realist IR theory to really liberal internationalism. And more back to, as I mentioned at the beginning, in 1949, NATO was always for something, not just against the Soviet Union, right? And so really in 1991, this is when we start to see consideration of promotion of democracy, expanded cooperation and dialogue with former Warsaw Pact members and even former Soviet states in Central and Eastern Europe. And of course, over time, the two biggest tranches are in 1999 with Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary being offered admission. And then in 2004, when, you know, seven more allies are admitted in of particular note, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which are the three former Soviet states. And so I think there's this tension inside of NATO where it kind of goes back and forth between realism and liberal institutionalism or liberal internationalism, I should say. And I wonder now if we might be at another inflection point, you know, where collective defense of Europe, it's an original reason for existing there with NATO, I wonder if that again becomes the central task of the alliance.

That makes a lot of sense. It's a very helpful way of thinking about the different motivations that have underpinned the development of NATO, including its expansion after the Cold War. Bryan, before we move on to that topic, which you've laid out so well, just give us a sense, both as a scholar and as a military leader. How does NATO function? Most people can at least identify it, but very few people know how it works. Some people think it's just a U.S.-led operation. Others have argued, including the last president, that it's a mess and that people are taking advantage of others. How does it really work?

Sure. So one of the great, one of my central critiques in my dissertation is that NATO historians, scholars, and I would just say everyday pundits treat NATO from, you know, with the state as the central unit of analysis. And NATO is often considered just an aggregation of X number of members' state preferences. The United States, of course, has always had the largest economy and the largest military inside of NATO. And therefore, you know, its preferences are seen as counting, you know, the most relative to other allies. And I think that that's, you know, a fundamentally insufficient means of understanding the alliance and how it works. The institution of NATO matters and the institution of NATO, specifically its political headquarters in Brussels, and then its military headquarters at SHAPE in Mons. And I think too often we overlook the key role that institutional leaders represented by the secretary general, you know, at the political headquarters in Brussels and then the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, particularly during the Cold War, but even still today, really play a central role in what policies or adaptations NATO makes. And so I think NATO is, you know, we have to account for the institution as well in any kind of outcomes and not just treat it as an aggregation of states.

And just to build on that, Bryan, one of the points you make so well in your dissertation that I think is so relevant for today is that, first of all, the different states have a say in what NATO does, the United States doesn't just get to call the shots, but also that the institutional leaders of NATO, those who have, in a sense, left their own government services and been seconded over to NATO, either in a political role or a military role, that they operate and have great influence on the decisions NATO makes. Is that true? And could you explain to us how that works? Because I don't think most people understand that.

Absolutely. And I think that was a great synopsis of what I find in my dissertation. But another one of the central themes that you just described is the power of what I call "transnational interpersonal networks." And so, you know, there are a community, it's not formally organized, of just experienced NATO hands. It could be political leaders, it may be many times academics, sometimes it's retired military officers. And through their experience and their jobs, their assignments over their careers, working in NATO, they gain a really rich understanding of sort of what's in the realm of possible, either politically or militarily, for the alliance, you know, to be able to do with whatever the issue of the day is at hand.

I want to sort of foot stomp on something you touched on with your previous question, Jeremy, which is that it's really key to understand NATO is a consensus-based organization. That means with today with 30 members, all 30 members have to consent for NATO to, you know, to take a policy action. And, you know, I think sometimes we see how hard it is in a simple, you know, to find a simple majority. Right? And so one might imagine that it can be difficult to find consensus. And so a central critique sometimes is that that limits the boldness, let's say, of NATO adaptations, because you need all 30 members to agree.

With the power of transnational interpersonal networks, in one of my case studies, I look at the NATO training mission in Iraq, which begins in 2004 following the Istanbul summit. And of course, this is on the heels of NATO is trying to heal its wounds over the decision by the American-led coalition of the willing to go to war in Iraq. And of course, you know, several NATO allies, most notably France and Germany, are adamant opponents of this, while others like the United States, United Kingdom and many of the newer allies in Central and Eastern Europe form the coalition of the willing. And so, you know, the alliance is really at a low point here and its political leaders get together at the Istanbul summit 2004 and say, hey, you know, we would like NATO to have a role in Iraq. And the SACEUR at the time, General James Jones, who later is the Obama administration National Security Advisor, realizes that there is no military plan for NATO to have in Iraq. And so he quickly, he leaves the Istanbul summit on June 29th. Rather than flying back to SHAPE headquarters in Belgium, he immediately goes to Washington, D.C. He calls just an informal network of advisors. Some of them, they're multinational on both sides of the Atlantic. Some are academics. Some are retired military officers. In one case, it's a former secretary general. And they convene very hastily in Washington, D.C. and say, you know, what type of military mission do we think is politically palatable? And, you know, we'll add value on the ground in Iraq. And so, you know, they come up with three lines of effort, which is to train the Iraqi security forces in Iraq, a second line of effort to train them out of Iraq, and a third line of effort, which is to equip the Iraqi security forces. And based on the advice and experience of these sort of old hands, that plan is ultimately approved, and the NATO training mission in Iraq moves out with those three lines of effort, and I think makes a pretty significant contribution over seven years to developing the Iraqi security forces. So that's kind of an anecdote that I think really captures the power of transnational interpersonal networks.

That makes a lot of sense. And that's a great example to see that at work, even in a controversial setting, as in the war in Iraq. Bryan, do you see merit or not in Vladimir Putin's claim that this transnational network and this alliance is inherently threatening to Russia?

I do not, because I think it takes away the agency of about 15 Central and Eastern European countries. Ultimately, these are countries that have sought democracy, they have sought individual liberty, and they've sought to become part of the West, politically, militarily, economically. And I think that their vote counts just as much as Russia's.

And so do you see ways in which NATO could have worked more effectively with Russia that were not pursued recently? And why were they not pursued?

Yeah, so there's one of the sort of inflection points is at 2008, at the Bucharest summit, that I think is very relevant today, you know, for our listeners to understand. At the Bucharest summit, this is where NATO offers a map or a membership action plan to Ukraine and Georgia. At the time, Putin had made a major foreign policy speech earlier in the year at the Munich Security Conference, implying that territorial borders and boundaries change repeatedly over history, and neighboring countries' borders weren't sacrosanct to Russia. And so once NATO offers a membership action plan to those two countries, right after that is when we see, you know, Russian military activity in Georgia, and then ultimately down the road in 2014, and today in Ukraine. And so I think as we think back in 1991, Russia was offered, you know, a spot in NATO's partnership for peace along with other former Warsaw Pact members. And for a time, it was an active member. But after a few years, Russian interest sort of fell off and they stopped participating in NATO.

Do you think that Putin's obvious obsession with Ukraine, as well as Georgia, and his anger at NATO expansion, were there things we could have done in retrospect, even if it's predominantly driven by his own desires and his own preferences, nonetheless, are there things we could have done? Some have argued that we expanded NATO too fast. Some have argued we could have done more to build peaceful bridges between NATO and Russia. You've lived through this as an officer and you've studied it. What's your take on the decade before where we are right now?

So I think, you know, obviously, in 2014, when Russia annexes Crimea, and then, you know, sends in, you know, little green men to the Donbass region, it's kind of been, relations have been at rock bottom since then. But I do think that there were some opportunities prior to that. In fact, if we look at NATO's, you know, most recent strategic concept from 2010, it refers to Russia as a strategic partnership. Obviously, that, you know, that phrase looks pretty out of date and irrelevant, as we look at today's events. But, you know, finding peace and partnership is also a two-way street. And, you know, there has not been much indication from the Russian side, despite overtures from numerous presidential administrations for a Russian reset, and also from the institutional leaders of NATO, from NATO Secretary Generals, you know, to find ways, you know, towards peace and a common worldview.

Why do you think that is? Why is it that Russia seems to find itself at constantly at odds with NATO, or at the very least, sees NATO as an inherently hostile force?

Sure. So, you know, Vladimir Putin has famously said, the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century was the disintegration of the Soviet Union. And so, more recently, I think, as recently as last week, we've seen in his speeches, where he also talks even beyond the, you know, the 50 or so year history of the Soviet Union, he talks about the Russian Empire. And he sees Russia as a great power, and Russia has a, you know, a right to a sphere of influence. Because of, again, because of, you know, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, by and large, have demonstrated a desire to be part to be free to be part of the West. And those countries reside, you know, their land is where Putin understands the Russian sphere of influence to reside. And so there's inevitable conflict there.

Bryan, I want to be attentive to your assets that you cannot necessarily share in our discussion. With that said, what can you tell us about how NATO is responding to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the last six days?

I think it's also worth noting that, you know, German Chancellor Merkel, for 16 years, she worked, you know, to bring peace and partnership through economic trade. And, you know, as a result, you know, today, we see that, you know, about 40% of Germany's energy needs comes from Russia. And unfortunately, that does not seem to have satiated Putin's desire to invade neighbors.

Right, right. Why do you think he's invaded now?

I think as we look at Russia, they have a long term economic decline projected, I think, as a larger portion, you know, because their economy is so reliant on oil and natural gases. You know, as many countries around the world pursue renewable energy. They also have long term demographic problems. They have poor public health. And I think for that reason, Putin may realize that Russia is probably as strong today as it will be for a really long time. Similarly, as he looks at Ukraine, and we've seen Ukraine aggressively move towards the West. And I think that at the end of the day, Putin's number one concern is staying in power and regime survival. And it really undercuts his autocratic model to see a successful democracy aligned with the West right next door in what he considers his ethnic kinmen.

Right. So in many ways, this does echo certain elements of the history of World War I and other periods when a particular power sees itself in its maximum moment of leverage and sees trends working against it. This is an old argument among many historians, which is that countries concerned about their decline are actually some of the most dangerous countries. That said, Bryan, what is NATO doing? How are we responding to Russia's invasion of Ukraine?

So there's a number of initiatives from NATO, and many of them started in 2014 and have been accelerated over the past six months. And I think we'll see them continue to evolve over the next few years. So, again, I think 2014 is the key moment to understand. And this is, of course, as I said, starts with Russia annexing Crimea. And NATO at the 2014 Wales Summit does a number of things which are relevant today and beyond. NATO adopts a readiness action plan. And this is where they triple the size of the available NATO response force on the military side, create a very high readiness joint task force for crises like this, for example, that could be employed. And then on the political side, all allies agree to spend two percent of their national GDP on defense within 10 years, so by 2024. And that was a significant milestone for the alliance in terms of burden sharing. As we look at initiatives going forward, six months before this war in Ukraine started, the NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg had already initiated a strategic concept review and process. As I mentioned earlier, NATO's most recent strategic concept is 12 years old now, written in 2010. And so this summer, pre-conflict this summer, NATO intended to agree to a new strategic concept at the Madrid summit in June. And I think it will be really interesting to watch because the strategic concept process was started before there was the crisis in Ukraine. And so it'll be really interesting to see what stays the same, what moves beyond.

I really love the process that NATO is using, though, to drive adaptation. So NATO has produced two reports over in the past few months. One of them is called the NATO 2030 report, written by a bunch of leading experts. And in that one, we see calls for increased national resiliency, among other things, you know, energy security as another initiative. And then we also see NATO produces a second report independently created. It's called the Young Leaders report. And I think that it's really important. I think NATO is really getting it right to get the perspectives of multiple generations of NATO scholars as it looks how to posture itself going forward. I certainly, you know, can't predict the outcome of the current conflict in Ukraine, but we absolutely are seeing NATO aggressively, you know, seek to create a deterrence effect along its eastern flank. Nobody knows at this point what Putin's endgame is. He hasn't said, you know, does it go beyond Ukraine? And so I think it's not coincidental that we see the former Warsaw Pact members and former Soviet states, particularly Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and I would put Romania in this category too, as the most vocal. Bilaterally, not through NATO, but bilaterally are transferring the largest number, for example, of anti-tank weapon systems to the Ukrainian people to defend themselves. And so we see that the NATO response force has been activated for the first time for collective defense purpose, you know, since it was created. We've seen increased deployments from the Germans, from the British, and from the Americans to further the deterrence effect, you know, for the forces that were already in place in the three Baltic countries in Poland and Romania.

And many are saying, including the President of the United States, that this moment has strengthened NATO. German Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz, in announcing a major new German contribution to NATO, transformative contribution also made that point. Do you think NATO will be stronger now as a consequence of Putin's terrible actions?

So, there's this really tragic dichotomy, right. On the one hand, you can't, can't help but be inspired as we see the bravery and the courage of the Ukrainian citizens against really difficult odds. At the same time, you know, in my 20 years of active service, and, and looking beyond that, as a bit of a NATO historian, this is the most united NATO's ever been, and you mentioned the speech by, you know, Germany's new chancellor, and I think that that's worth double underlining, and you know, I think it was one of the most pivotal foreign policy speeches, I think, in Europe, probably since 2007 when, when Putin made that, you know, really frightening speech at the Munich Security Conference, but you know, Germany, of course, has been the economic heavyweight of the European Union for many years, you know, but in many cases, because of national restrictions they've placed on themselves because of the history of the two world wars, Germany has not wanted to be the leader on the military side of NATO, and so they've always been one of the countries that sort of has a lower percentage of their GDP spent on defense, and it was amazing, and I think groundbreaking, and will really change the future trajectory of NATO when Schultz announced that, you know, an immediate doubling of defense spending, you know, an immediate movement away from energy reliance on Russia, and so I think what we're seeing is the emergence of Germany, you know, not, you know, always, or not always, but you know, for quite a while has been economic heavyweight, and I think that they will become the military heavyweight among European countries and NATO as well, and I think that has a lot of second and third order effects.

So our closing question here, Bryan, we always like to close on an optimistic note. You have given us so much inside, thoughtful information on the historical trajectory, the organizational roles, and the various adaptations of NATO before and during this war. Are you optimistic about the future of NATO? What are the contributions beyond Ukraine that you look for in a post-Ukraine War moment for NATO. What will NATO do to help make democracies and security more common in Europe and elsewhere?

So I'm extremely optimistic about the future of NATO and the three principles that it stands for democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law. You know, I wrote down a quote that Chancellor Scholz said towards the beginning of his speech, and he said entering a new era, and that means that the world we now live in is not the one that we knew before. Peace and freedom in Europe have a price tag, and I think that that is really important to think about, you know, before any of this crisis in Ukraine, you know, there's been democratic backsliding in a number of NATO countries on both sides of the Atlantic, and you know, this is an opportunity, NATO, NATO has a history of adapting it needs a crisis to adapt in positive ways to sort of shake it from its state, you know, from from being in stasis, and so this is a real opportunity here. I think we'll see a number of initiatives that come from the alliance to enhance national resiliency, to focus on the protection of democratic processes and institutions, you know, to create a real deterrence effect along the eastern flank to protect its most vulnerable allies, and I think the future is bright for NATO.

That's that's so compelling and important to hear, Zachary, as a young person who's been deeply moved by the plight of Ukrainians and shaken by the evidence of Russian aggression, we talked about this last week on the podcast, do you share this optimism about NATO? And even more important, really, is NATO an institution that you and other young people think about and look to when you think about the future of security and democracy in the world?

I think NATO is definitely something that is relevant and indeed increasingly discussed and and debated, but I do think it's important to note that even as NATO recommits itself to its principles and the threats it was founded to counter that there are also broader humanitarian concerns and and moral obligations that it has to countries like Ukraine in crisis and and under threat, even if they don't have treaty obligations or or necessarily legal obligations, so I think that the new rebirth, if you will, of NATO as relevant and deeply important to almost every policy discussion that we're having today, has to also come with a renewed focus on its principles.

and so you think NATO should be more involved in Ukraine?

I, obviously, I'm not going to pretend like I know enough to talk about that, but I think that it's important for NATO to to listen to people in Ukraine, and personally I think that probably should be more action in Ukraine, or at least greater efforts to make the Ukrainian people know that we're doing as much as we can.

Final word for you, Bryan. Any comments on that?

Yeah, it's, you know, it's really difficult for me to, you know, comment on current policy, but I think, you know, bilaterally, but not through the institution of NATO, many allies are doing a lot of things for for the Ukrainian people right now, in the, you know... and most notably, the economic sanctions in the United Front that NATO members, and really a lot of global allies, have taken as well against Russia, and I guess I would just add, as well, you know, I think it is fascinating, and feeds my optimism for the future of NATO, and the unity, really, of the West. You know, I saw a survey today from a Finnish broadcasting company in January. Only 30% of Finns favor joining NATO. Today, 53%, 66% if done in tandem with Sweden, and I think that that speaks to the values that NATO stands for, and how maybe Putin, because of his, you know, aggressive actions, illegal actions, and war crimes, I think is waking up some historically neutral countries in Europe and around the world, you know, freedom and democracy are worth fighting for, and I think more and more countries are seeing that.

It's such a great point, Bryan and Zachary, and I think there's another historical insight here, you know, moments of crisis, moments of horror and nightmare, they reveal a lot of things about an institution and a set of actors, and we've learned a lot about Vladimir Putin. Not necessarily new things, but we've learned a lot about him in the last few days. We've learned a lot about Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the leader of Ukraine. We've learned a lot about NATO also, and it is, I think heartening and optimistic to see that in a time of challenge some institutions are able to respond effectively and turn those challenges, as horrible as they are, into opportunities, and it does seem that NATO, at least right now, is doing that, and we're fortunate to have institutions like this. A core point of your research, Bryan, and your career is that these institutions matter. It's not just the policies they pursue, it's the quality of institutions, and it's a central theme in our podcast, week after week. Democracy is not just about democratic actors, it's about democratic institutions that need to be nurtured and protected and respected, and we're fortunate to have NATO, as imperfect as it is, nonetheless there as an institution, as you say, that can defend and promote these values that we care so much about now, and I think that's really central to our discussion. Bryan, you have shared history and contemporary understanding and analysis with us, you've given us a better sense of what NATO is, how it works, and where it's going, and we're very grateful for you sharing your time and insights with us today, Bryan. Thank you so much.

Thank you. It's absolutely been my pleasure. And every time I hear from Jeremi and Zachary, I learn more.

Well, as you said before, I think it's more from Zachary than from Jeremi, but that's okay. And Zachary, thank you for your poem, and your question, and your insights. And thank you most of all to our loyal listeners. We hope you all are following the news and finding reasons for productive, optimistic historical thinking to move our world forward in this important time. Thank you for joining us for this episode of This Is Democracy.

This podcast is produced by the Liberal Arts ITS Development Studio and the College of Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin. The music in this episode was written and recorded by Harris Codini. Stay tuned for a new episode every week. You can find This Is Democracy on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Stitcher. See you next time. Bye.